Abstract: This study examines how the pattern of a firm's alliance ego-network, as well as that of its partners, may have a contingent effect on the firm's patenting behaviour for exploratory and exploitative innovation. The research data came from 1894 strategic alliances by 455 biotechnology firms and their patents in the period 1986-1999. The study concluded that centrality in the whole alliance network is beneficial to patenting within many secondary classes (i.e., exploitative innovation) because it enables experiential search for knowledge, whereas a focal firm's partners' centrality is beneficial to patenting across many primary classes (exploratory innovation) because it enables cognitive search for knowledge. Experience in making alliances was also found to be significant for all types of innovation output, indicating that network pattern contingency and alliance experience as a capability have to be present simultaneously to deliver enhanced innovation performance.
Introduction
Evolutionary economics view knowledge as a set of recipes encompassing both physical components and processes as key ingredients (Dosi and Grazzi, 2010; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Sorenson et al., 2006) . The conceptualisation of knowledge as recipes leads to thinking of innovation as a process of searching for new recipes (Sorenson et al., 2006) over a space of possible combinations of ingredients (Nelson and Winter, 1982) , or as search over a problem landscape (Sorenson et al., 2006) . The types of innovation generated by these processes have been identified as exploratory and exploitative (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009 ). Exploratory innovation is defined as the creation of knowledge that differs from that used by the firm in prior innovations, even though this knowledge may have been in existence earlier elsewhere (March, 1991) . On the other hand, exploitative innovation focuses on the refinement and extension of a firm's existing knowledge (March, 1991) . Cooperation (Nunes et al., 2013; Siikonen et al., 2011) and strategic alliances have been identified in the literature as better suited than market transactions for the exchange and development of knowledge and they can lead to increased innovation output (e.g., de Man and Duysters, 2005; Huggins et al., 2012; Phelps, 2010) . Strategic alliances (also referred to as 'alliances' or 'ties') are defined as inter-organisational entities that imply the sharing and developing knowledge and resources of participating firms (Ahuja, 2000) . In the context of this paper, alliances are understood to be of technological nature, utilised by firms to gain access to and develop useful knowledge in technological fields and to reduce technological uncertainty. As a focal firm forms alliances, it builds an ego-network -defined as the alliances that the firm has entered over time. The alliance ego-networks of firms participating in an industry collectively build a 'whole' industry alliance network -defined as a set of industry participating firms and the alliances between them (Karamanos, 2012) .
Network structure is central to the diffusion of information and innovations (Burt, 2005; Bratkovic-Kregar et al., 2012) , and the pooling of technologies and knowledge (Jiang and Li, 2009; Henning and Saggau, 2012) . Extant research has revealed two competing perspectives regarding the effects of a firm's ego-network structure. One view argues that a firm's ego-network should be open (or non-redundant, or sparse, or rich in 'structural holes') [Burt, 1992 [Burt, , 2005 , and a completely open ego-network arises when a firm's alliance partners have no alliances among themselves (Burt, 1992) (the terms 'partner' and 'alliance partner' are used interchangeably in this paper). However, the reported benefits of open ego-networks are mixed and their influence on innovation marginal (Rodan and Galunic, 2004) . The alternative view suggests that a firm's ego-network should be closed (or redundant, or dense) (Coleman, 1988) and a completely closed ego-network arises when all of a firm's alliance partners are also partners of each other. The associated closure benefits, namely resource-sharing and rapid diffusion of knowledge among partners (Ahuja, 2000) , improve knowledge transfer and innovation because they enhance the efficiency and speed of collaboration (Gilsing, 2005) . Moreover, empirical contributions have confirmed that the effect of ego-network structure (whether closed or open) on innovation is contingent on the type of innovation task at hand -exploratory and/or exploitative -and that a contingency approach might be more effective (Hernández-Espallardo et al., 2011; Oerlemans et al., 2013; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Yamakawa et al., 2011) . The contingency approach argues that a firm has to identify the type of innovation that it is interested in -exploratory and/or exploitative -and then design an ego-network that is more likely to be facilitative to the innovation type sought (Graf and Kruger, 2011; Oerlemans et al., 2013; Yamakawa et al., 2011) .
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it focuses on what alliance ego-network structures matter for the creation of knowledge and the production of innovation. The novel contribution is that the paper observes that some firms within the 'whole' network, around which the network centralises, often play a central role in the development of dominant logics within the network (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004) , and drive the entire network evolution as they set the foundations for network learning (Powell et al., 2005) . Therefore, this paper sets out to develop a theoretical contribution that combines the structure of a focal firm's ego-network with the ego-network structural characteristics of its partners, to capture the possibility that a focal firm's partner is one of the key firms that drive network evolution, and, thus, partner characteristics may affect a focal firm's innovation performance (Whitley, 2002) as the network evolves. Second, it advances the contingency approach and it highlights alliance ego-network structures as tools through which different types of innovation are achieved (Graf and Krugger, 2011; Karamanos, 2012; Phelps, 2010) and it does so in a dynamic way, i.e., this is a longitudinal study of ego-network evolution. The present paper addresses a research opportunity entailing to how a firm's alliance ego-network structure, as well as that of its partners, may have a contingent effect on its exploratory and exploitative innovation. The research milieu for this paper is the biotechnology industry, which has exhibited the highest alliance activity among all the industries studied in prior research and it has a rich history of papers on the importance of strategic alliances as a mechanism for knowledge sharing, knowledge creation and innovation (e.g., Powell et al., 1996 Powell et al., , 2005 .
Which ego-network pattern for exploitative and exploratory innovation?
Organisational learning literature has emphasised how firms search for knowledge to produce innovation (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . In the case of experiential search, firms exploit their existing knowledge and typically develop efficient organisational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) geared towards timely and predictable returns (March, 1991) . Such routines reflect experiential wisdom in that they are the outcome of trial-and-error learning, and the selection and retention of prior behaviours (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . In this vein, forming strategic alliances is attractive as both partners have a good understanding of the relevant issues at hand and alliances function as 'pipelines' through which knowledge flows between firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004) , enabling the rapid diffusion of recipes among partners and enhancing the efficiency and speed of collaboration (Gilsing, 2005) . Although integrating external knowledge through alliances can overcome limitations, it is generally costly in terms of time and resources and more risky than deriving solutions solely from one's existing knowledge base (March, 1991; Sorenson et al., 2006) . In this case, cognitive search can be used to reduce the costs of using external knowledge, and it occurs when firms cognitively evaluate alternative recipes, ingredients and combinations (Fleming, 2001; Nieto and Santamaria, 2007) and assess their implications for solution performance, which are subsequently investigated via experiential search (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . This argument points to a different role for a firm's strategic alliances, namely to produce novel recombinations of knowledge (Obstfeld, 2005 ) rather than to function as 'pipelines' for the diffusion of knowledge.
Ego-network closure
The majority of research on the structure of a firm's ego-network has focused on its relative closure and it is reflected by a firm's centrality in the 'whole' network (Coleman, 1988; Madhavan et al., 1998; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . A firm's centrality in the 'whole' network is associated with two distinct kinds of network closure benefits, namely resource-sharing and information spillovers. First, a focal firm's ties hold knowledge that is novel to the firm, and the existing knowledge of a firm and that of its partners may be recombined through collaboration, yielding recipes that are new to the firm (Ahuja, 2000) . As a result, a centrally positioned firm is connected to different knowledge 'pipelines' in the network (Powell et al., 1996) and it plays the role of a hub, so that other firms in the network must go through this central firm in order to access other firms' recipes (Freeman, 1979) . Network centrality should then be an advantage particularly for exploitative innovation through experiential search, as focal firms draw on their knowledge to exploit an increased number of potential recipes that complement their own (Fleming, 2001; Nieto and Santamaria, 2007) coming through the network 'pipelines'. The second benefit of network closure is that knowledge is probably shared a variable amount easier than otherwise due to higher levels of perceived information accuracy and aligned partners' interests (Burt, 2005) . This may be beneficial for exploitative innovation, where the emphasis is on firms being willing and motivated to invest time and effort to share knowledge with partners (Regans and McEvily, 2003) . Research has shown that central firms located in dense regions of a 'whole' network through multiple ties share fundamental value systems (e.g., Huber, 1991) , facilitate the diffusion of norms across the network (e.g., Wood and Gray, 1991) , enhance communication effectiveness, provide shared meaning and understanding between network members and nurture trust in the network (Gulati et al., 2000) . Shared values and norms develop the expectation that partners will proactively and voluntarily provide timely and tacit information necessary for successful alliances, and, in this case, central firms share less distorted, richer, and higher quality recipes (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) with confidence, because the development of norms of reciprocity and sanctions for the violation of trust dampens opportunistic behaviour, enhances knowledge transfer and integration, and gears the collaborations towards value creation (Regans and McEvilty, 2003) . As such, central firms can control and exploit opportunities in the industry, as well as control the trajectory and direction of recipes created in the network (Koka and Prescott, 2008) . Network centrality allows a focal firm to have deeper understanding of alternative interpretations of technical problems and solutions through multiple partners, thus comparing and contrasting these perspectives (Nonaka, 1994) . Thus, central firms are expected to be able to delve deep into their technology fields, synergistically work to exploit their specialised knowledge and generate patents within many secondary classes as they delve into exploitation. Accordingly, I submit that, other things being equal, Hypothesis 1 There is a positive relationship between the number of a focal firm's secondary patent classes and its centrality in the 'whole' alliance network.
Non-redundant ego-network
Opportunities for exploration entail the likelihood of a break away from the established way of doing things and the experimentation with and the discovery of new knowledge (March, 1991) . Amara and Landry (2005) have noted that firms introducing innovations with a greater degree of novelty are more likely to use a wider range of recipe sources, but such a search is probably expensive in terms of time and effort. Expanding into new domains and technological innovations novel to the firm most probably requires cognitive search, which can reduce the uncertainty and costs of using external knowledge (Yang et al., 2010) and increases the variance of potential solutions (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . Cognitive search occurs when a focal firm's mental representations of the environment are used to identify potentially valuable combinations quickly and the combinations are subsequently investigated via experiential search (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . Because a firm can evaluate a solution without directly implementing it, cognitive search is cheaper than experiential search, reduces the risks of experimentation and increases the efficiency of exploring external recipes (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . As all knowledge is not equally accessible to a focal firm, Burt (1992) introduced the structural holes argument, which is concerned with the notion of redundancy. A firm's ego-network that connects two otherwise disconnected subgroups in the 'whole' network is said to be non-redundant and bridges a structural hole. So a focal firm's ego-network has redundancy to the extent that the firm's partners are connected to each other as well. Structural holes should enable cognitive search because, as Uzzi and Spiro (2005) noted, bridges between disconnected parts of networks increase the likelihood that different ideas, perspectives and recipes will come into contact, as disconnected subgroups will have heterogeneous backgrounds, knowledge, skills, and expertise. So this type of networking serves as a screening device (Leonard-Barton, 1984 ) that allows for relevant developments in diverse technologies to be brought to the firm's attention through cognitive search and eventually to develop new understandings through the recombination of previously isolated knowledge perspectives (Koka and Prescott, 2008) . Also, a focal firm with ties that span multiple knowledge pools has stronger capacity for novel problem solving because it can activate its network that is rich in structural holes to identify the sources that are likely to be well informed about the specific issue at hand (Regans et al., 2004) . Moreover, because maintaining ties to many other firms is costly, firms that bridge structural holes enjoy improved efficiency in their network structure for bringing together otherwise isolated recipes, thus conserving scarce managerial resources (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) . These arguments lead to the conclusion that there is probably a positive relationship between a firm's ego-network pattern that spans structural holes and exploratory innovation output (operationalised as patenting in primary classes) due to the associated enhanced cognitive search capability that eventually leads to more efficient experiential search for novel recipes. Accordingly, I submit that, other things being equal, Hypothesis 2 There is a positive relationship between the number of a firm's primary patent classes and the number of structural holes it spans in the 'whole' alliance network.
Alliance partner's ego-network closure
Alliances provide a firm with access to its partners' routines, which reduces ambiguity about a partner's knowledge and increases the efficacy of knowledge transfer and assimilation (Jensen and Szulanski, 2007) . Accordingly, research on ego-network structure as determinant of firm-level outcomes, such as innovation performance, has been augmented by considering partners' characteristics (e.g., Gulati et al., 2000) . Yang et al. (2010) have highlighted an innovative firm's knowledge spillover pool as a discrete knowledge element and a unique characteristic to each individual firm. In the context of a strategic alliance, a spillover is defined as an unintentional transmission of knowledge to others beyond the intended boundary. If knowledge is exchanged with the intended alliance partners, it is defined as 'knowledge transfer', but any knowledge that is exchanged outside the intended boundary is a spillover. Thus, a firm's spillover knowledge pool represents all external recipes that have been linked directly to its knowledge base by partner firms through spillovers during the sum of its alliances (Yang et al., 2010) . As a partner firm's spillover knowledge pool grows larger with its increasing centrality in the 'whole' alliance network, it probably contributes a greater number of relatively accessible external knowledge components/recipes that can be used as inputs to the innovation process of focal firms (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001 ) through experiential search. Also, larger spillover knowledge pools of partner firms provide focal firms with a large number of recipes as input to their cognitive search effort (March, 1991) . Firms learn vicariously by observing the behaviour and associated performance outcomes of partner firms with large spillover pools, by modelling or imitating behaviours that seem successful and avoiding behaviours that seem unsuccessful (Cyert and March, 1963) . By observing the innovative activities of partner firms and the outcomes of these activities, a focal firm can develop a cognitive model of how and why a new combination of recipes is formed without attempting the combination (Cyert and March, 1963 ). This cognitive model can be used by focal firms as a guide for future experiential search by identifying potentially valuable knowledge elements and combinations, detecting elements and combinations to avoid, and providing insight into the organisational routines (Zaheer and Bell, 2005 ) that led to the creation of innovation (Sorenson et al., 2006) . Building on these arguments, I suggest that a focal firm tied to a partner with a large knowledge spillover pool, due to the latter's centrality in the 'whole' alliance network, may be in a better position to engage in exploratory innovation because vicarious learning with the partner and effective cognitive search may lead to subsequent efficiency in experiential search for novel recipes. Accordingly, I submit that, other things being equal, Hypothesis 3 There is a positive relationship between the number of a firm's primary patent classes and its partners' centrality in the 'whole' alliance network.
Research methodology

Research setting and alliance network data
A network is a set of nodes connected by a set of ties. In this paper, the nodes are the biotechnology companies and the ties are the strategic alliances between them. I tested the hypotheses using a large sample of strategic alliances formed by dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) during the period 1986-1999. As I was interested in technical knowledge diffusion, I used only alliances with the purpose of technology licensing, research and/or development and/or commercialisation, thus excluding marketing, manufacturing and distribution deals. Alliance data were gathered from the Historical Actions Database provided by BioAbility.com and I had data on 1894 alliances by 455 DBFs during the period 1986-1999. The life-span of alliances is usually assumed to be no more than five years (Kogut, 1989) , therefore the author constructed five year alliance network moving windows between 1986 and 1999 (data was available for 1981 onwards), and each network was constructed as an adjacency matrix (the adjacency matrix for a network of N nodes is a matrix of ones and zeros where a one indicates the presence of the corresponding tie in the network) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . Where pairs of partners had multiple alliances with each other in a year, the author added the individual scores of each alliance to form a composite index. Also, the data were coded to reflect the different scope of collaboration (Borgatti et al., 2002; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Koza and Lewin, 2000) . To explore the multidimensionality of alliance scope, alliance data were categorised using a 4-point scale, where 1 indicates a licensing tie, 2 a tie mainly focused on pure research, 3 a tie mainly focused on pure development, and 4 a tie that included R&D and commercialisation. The coding of the alliance data created valued adjacency matrices that were inputted to UCINET 6 to obtain network measures, as described in the next section (Borgatti et al., 2002) . All patenting data were retrieved from Delphion.com database, which reports US Patent Office data for all the firms in the sample, of which a small proposition were based outside the USA. Granted patents were counted in the year of application. Especially in industries where firms operate on an international or global scale, patents may be a good proxy for firms' innovative performance (Ahuja, 2000; Markatou, 2013) .
Measures
Dependent variables
Research has concluded that patents are valid and robust indicators of knowledge creation (Friedman and Prusak, 2008; Markatou, 2013) , they are widely used to measure intellectual property and provide a good platform for examining innovation (Wu and Shanley, 2009) . Technological profiles of all companies were created by logging the patents a firm filed for in each primary and secondary patent class for each year of observation. The first dependent variable, Secondary_Classes, was calculated as the number of secondary patent classes divided by the number of primary patent classes in which a firm filed for patents during a year of observation. The second dependent variable, Primary_Classes, was a count variable of the number of primary patent classes in which a firm filed for patents during a year of observation. As the propensity to patent may differ due to firm characteristics (Wu and Shanley, 2009 ), I attempted to control for sources of heterogeneity using the control variable Presample_Patents (described below) and random effects in the model estimations.
Independent variables
Centrality and partner centrality
Central firms are aware of whatever is going on in the 'whole' alliance network and network centrality can facilitate the transfer, sharing and generation of critical information and knowledge (Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006; Simonin, 2004) .A firm's network centrality considers how centrally positioned a firm is in the network, thereby explicitly including the firm's capability to access or control the various resources and information in the network through its direct and indirect ties (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003) . Betweenness centrality is a measure of centrality that accounts for the position in the whole network (whereas degree centrality is only based on the ego-network) (Freeman, 1979) . It is calculated as the frequency with which a firm is positioned between pairs of other firms in the network on the shortest path connecting them. As a result, a centrally positioned firm is better connected to knowledge and resource exchange flows in the network (Powell et al., 1996) . As a result, this quantity can be used to produce an ordering of the firms in the network in terms of their individual importance (Kolaczyk et al., 2009 ). The variable Centrality refers to the betweeness centrality score of a focal firm in any given five year window, and the variable Partner_Centrality refers to the average of the Centrality values of a firm's partners in any given 5-year window. The variable Partner_Centrality was transformed by taking the natural logarithm in order to address a lack of linearity (Cohen et al., 2003) .
Structural holes
Firms bridging structural holes have been frequently shown to perform better than other actors not so positioned (Burt, 1992 (Burt, , 2005 . As knowledge is developed partially through interaction (Carlucci and Schiuma, 2007; Nieto and Santamaria, 2007) , actors that bridge structural holes will be able to develop new understandings, especially regarding emergent threats and opportunities not possible to those who do not bridge holes, and, additionally, because maintaining too many ties to other actors is costly, it will be more efficient to eliminate redundant ties (Burt, 1997; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001 ). Moreover, actors bridging structural holes may be better able to find out the quality of possible exchange partners and potential allies (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005) . Hence, by bridging structural holes a focal firm will be well positioned to efficiently and quickly learn about and develop novel responses. The value of structural holes has been examined empirically by, for example, Ahuja (2000) in the context of the international chemical industry and Baum et al. (2003) study the sources of inter-clique link formation in the Canadian merchant banking industry. The variable Efficiency was used to assess the presence of structural holes in a focal firm's ego-network structure. Burt's (1992) efficiency measure calculates the effective size of a focal firm's ego-network (essentially, the number of partners minus the average degree of partners within the ego-network, not counting ties to focal firm) divided by the number of partners in the focal firm's ego-network. The 'network> ego network> structural holes' UCINET routine was used (Borgatti et al., 2002) .
Control variables
Alliance experience
At the firm level, a focal firm's alliance portfolio needs to be studied in conjunction with resources/capabilities internal to the firm, in order to properly understand the sources of performance (Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005) . One such capability is alliance experience because it allows a firm to be better able to further acquire and assimilate knowledge in subsequent alliances and results in a well-honed alliance management capability that facilitates effective processes to access knowledge (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) . Alliance experience creates a great potential to internally build, adapt and review alliance management systems because the current alliance capabilities get challenged in every new alliance. For a firm that has no or little alliance experience, forming an alliance may enable it to draw important lessons with regard to the approach the other company uses and be able to faster climb on the learning curve. By looking at the partner's approach on the alliance process, its internal structures, processes, tools and dedicated human resources, the focal company can evaluate and improve its own internal alliance management process. A more effective alliance management process might also be a key in a more effective and/or efficient achievement of the strategic goals of the alliance. For instance, prior experience would reduce risks and costs for the firms involved by enabling quick mobilisation of knowledge between partners (Ahuja, 2000; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005) . Therefore, in line with previous research (e.g., Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) , the variable Alliance_Experience was used, which is a count measure of the number of direct ties (degrees) that a focal firm had in any given moving five year window, as a proxy for alliance management capability. In order to take into account similar capabilities by a focal firm's partners, the variable Partner_Alliance_Experience was used as an equivalent measure. In addition, the data were valued (to reflect 'strength' of tie) so the measures consisted of the sums of these values (Borgatti et al., 2002) .
Presample patents
To control for further unobserved heterogeneity in firms' patenting behaviour, I used a random effects statistical model as well as following the presample information approach by Blundell et al. (1995) . Moreover, an additional method of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is to include the number of times that the focal event (filling for a patent) has previously occurred for each firm (Karamanos, 2012) . To this effect, I calculated the variable Presample_Patents as the sum of patents obtained by a firm in the five years prior to its entry into the sample (I had data since 1980). Blundell et al. (1995) have argued that such a variable is a particularly good control for unobserved heterogeneity due to factors (such as interfirm differences in internal processes and incentive structures, as well as differences in underlying innovation strategies) that produce variance in firms' capabilities, opportunities, or dispositions to patent, at the time of entering the sample.
Country of origin
Firms that are headquartered in different countries may differ in their propensity to patent. Moreover, Asian and European firms may be less inclined to patent in the USA even when the biotechnology industry is widely recognised as a global industry. The variable Country was introduced to control for such effects.
Density
A dense 'whole' alliance network facilitates the build-up of trust, reputation and coalitions to constrain opportunism (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) . As a result, firms will be able to make greater relation-specific investments and enjoy reduced costs involved in monitoring their partners (Ahuja, 2000) . On the other hand, previous research has indicated that the rate and extent to which information diffuses in the network increases with density (Karamanos, 2012; Obstfeld, 2005) , and such diffusion of novelty throughout the network can put limits on knowledge appropriation and make it less attractive for firms to search for novelty (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) . I used the variable Network_Density to measure the 'whole' network density, calculated for each five year observation window. This variable measures the ratio of existing links in the network to the number of possible pair-wise combinations of firms, with larger values indicating increasing density. For the valued networks used in this analysis, it is the total of all values divided by the number of possible ties (Borgatti et al., 2002) . The variable was also transformed by taking the natural logarithm in order to address a lack of linearity.
Analysis
The dependent variables are count variables and take on only non-negative integer values. A Poisson regression approach provides a natural baseline model for count data, but patent data often exhibit heterogeneity (overdispersion), which violates the Poisson distribution's strong assumption that the mean and variance must be equal (Karamanos, 2012) . In this case, a commonly used alternative is panel data implementation of random effects in the context of a negative binomial model, which allows for heterogeneity by incorporating an individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean (Hilbe, 2011) . Moreover, negative binomial regression accounts for an omitted variable bias, while simultaneously estimating unobserved heterogeneity (Hilbe, 2011) . In the present study, unobserved heterogeneity refers to the possibility that unmeasured differences among observationally equivalent firms affect their patenting. The Hausman test was not significant in all models (χ 2 = 26.12; Prob> χ 2 = 0.0005) indicating that it is safe to use a random-effects specification. All models were estimated with Stata 10.0. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations between variables. Table 1 reveals on average low correlations between variables, except in the case of Partner_Centrality and Partner_Alliance_Experience. This can be an indication that multicollinearity is present, sometimes resulting in the signs of estimated coefficients to flip (Gujarati, 1995) , so the author decided to test these variables separately as well as together in a 'full' model. Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of the panel data for dependent variable Secondary_classes, and Table 3 reports the results for dependent variable Primary_classes. All the models shown in Tables 2 and 3 were significant compared to the null model (chisquare test). In Tables 2 and 3 , the first model (I and VI respectively) includes control variables only, the following three models test the hypotheses and the last model (V and X respectively) pools all the explanatory variables in one. Models V and X yielded empirical results that are consistent with previous models. For dependent variable Secondary_classes, Models II and V show that the coefficient for Centrality is positive and statistically significant, and it confirmed H1. For dependent variable, Primary_classes, Models VIII and X show that the coefficient for Efficiency is positive but not statistically significant to 95% level. So, although the direction of the relationship between Primary_classes and Efficiency is confirmed, H2 cannot be accepted. Finally, Models IX and X show that the coefficient for Partner_Centrality is positive and statistically significant, thus confirming H3. Models III, IV, and VI indicate that not all network independent variables are important to the two dependent variables, thus strengthening the hypothesis development. In all the models the coefficient for Alliance_Experience was positive and statistically significant, and the remaining control variables were statistically insignificant. 
Results
Discussion
This paper makes several theoretical and practical contributions to our understanding of a firm's innovation performance (e.g., Nunes et al., 2013) and it follows the line of research based on the contingency approach to network effects (Burt, 2005; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009 ). In the context of the contingency approach, the paper set out to develop a theoretical contribution that combines the structure of a focal firm's ego-network with the ego-network structural characteristics of its partners, to capture the possibility that a focal firm's partner is one of the key firms that drive network evolution, and, thus, partner characteristics may affect a focal firm's innovation performance (Whitley, 2002) as the network evolves. In the research milieu of the biotechnology industry, the results indicate that a focal firm's betweenness centrality in the 'whole' network is beneficial to patenting within many secondary classes (i.e., exploitative innovation), because a centrally positioned firm is better connected to recipe 'pipeline' flows in the network (Powell et al., 1996) that allow for effective experiential search. Moreover, the results indicate that a focal firm's partner's centrality is beneficial to the focal firm's patenting across many primary classes (i.e., exploratory innovation), because of vicarious learning with central partners with large knowledge spillover pools (Yang et al., 2010) . The results have also indicated that the number of a focal firm's primary patent classes (i.e., exploratory innovation) and the number of structural holes it spans in the 'whole' alliance network are positively related, but the relationship was found to be statistically significant only to 90% confidence level. This is consistent with Burt (2005) , who found that structural holes lead to good ideas but he found no evidence that they also lead to the successful implementation of these ideas. Recent empirical research has illustrated that the significance of structural holes is probably not universal but, rather, conditional on firm-level (Shipilov, 2006; Zaheer and Bell, 2005) and relational (alliance) attributes (Phelps, 2010) . As the regressions models in this study accounted for unobserved heterogeneity in the patenting behaviour of firms in the sample, I would argue that the significance of structural holes may be conditional on relational attributes (i.e., scope of the alliance). Although I implicitly took into account some relational characteristics by constructing valued adjacency matrices, a more detailed examination of this issue can be an avenue for future research. 'Whole' network density was not found to be significant, which is in accordance with Vanhaverbeke et al. (2009) who found that network component density has no effect on exploitative innovation. With regards to exploration, 'whole' network density had the expected sign although it lacked significance. This may be due to the observation that density and centralisation cannot simultaneously be maximised (Provan et al., 2007) , and that some tradeoff between the two must occur, i.e., the existence of a large number of ties does not necessarily mean that the network is centralised. Testing for the significance of 'whole' network centralisation may be an avenue for future research, as Karamanos (2012) found its effect on exploratory innovation to be positive and significant.
Overall, as far as the contribution of this paper goes, i.e., how a firm's alliance ego-network structure, as well as that of its partners, may have a contingent effect on its exploratory and exploitative innovation, the results indicate that an ego-network pattern conducive to exploratory innovation performance is not so much one that bridges structural holes, but one which ties the focal firm with centrally positioned partner firms that are well connected to different 'recipe' flows in the network (Madhavan et al., 1998; Powell et al., 1996) . Such central firms seem to have a distinct attribute in that they have large knowledge spillover pools and alliances with such partners seem to allow a focal firm to learn vicariously from its partners, as explained by Cyert and March (1963) . Finally, the results of this study have managerial implications, as they advocate a more action-oriented view of alliance network, with the aim of orchestrating networks in such way that managers can extract more value out of them. The results also indicate that firms with experience in making alliances have probably developed a well-honed alliance management capability that facilitates effective alliance management and higher innovation output (e.g., Castro Spila et al., 2010). It seems then that when firms combine their internal alliance management capability with a beneficial external ego-network pattern, they are better able to exploit and explore knowledge and transform it into patents. For exploratory innovation, it seems then that the best way for a company to 'cast its net widely' in order to reach new technological fields is through 'gatekeepers', and that the more experience a firm has in alliances the more it will be able to produce exploratory innovation patents. For exploitative innovation, the study found that it is the combination of 'whole' network centrality and alliance experience that enables the focal firm to absorb and transform the in-depth knowledge from the partners into patents in many secondary classes. Also, the partners' alliance management capability does not seem to be significantly linked to the focal firm's patent output, indicating that the absorption and transformation of knowledge by the focal firm into patents is an internal affair.
The results and contributions of this study should be considered in the light of its limitations, some of which could be explored in future research. First, because I used patents to assess exploratory innovation, the measure may not capture all of a firm's exploratory innovations. If firms systematically patent exploratory knowledge for unobserved reasons, parameter estimates may be biased (Karamanos, 2012) . Thus, firms may patent exploratory innovations before entering alliances to appropriate greater economic value. The use of a one-year lag between strategic alliance formation and patenting, and the use of firm effects in the statistical models reduce the likelihood of such a bias. Second, care must be taken in generalising these findings to other industry settings. The author cannot make any estimate about the generalisability of the findings outside the field of biotechnology. The results herein may be most relevant to hightechnology industries, where the pace of development is rapid and, consequently, innovative performance is critical. Also, the results are likely to be limited to industries that make frequent use of alliances, as networks characterised by extreme scarcity may not have a sufficient degree of connectedness to calculate meaningful network measures. Finally, as this study did not observe informal collaborative arrangements that exist between firms in the sample and promote knowledge transfer, the analysis represents a conservative test of the hypotheses. For instance, it is possible to examine a focal firm's interpersonal networks, e.g. communities of practice, or scientists' labour market mobility. A better understanding of the micro-sociological foundations that underlie the observed effects of alliance network pattern is needed to validate the causal inferences of this study.
• For the random-effects and fixed-effects overdispersion models, we let y it be the count for the t th observation in the i th group. We begin with the model y it γ it ~ Poisson (γ it ), where γ it δ i ~ Gamma (λ it , 1 / δ i ) with λ it = exp(x it β + offset it ) and δ i is the dispersion parameter. This yields the model ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Looking at within-group effects only, this specification yields a negative binomial model for the i th group with dispersion (variance divided by the mean) equal 1 + δ i ; i.e., constant dispersion within group. Note that this parameterisation of the negative binomial model differs from the default parameterisation of nbreg, which has dispersion equal to 1 + α exp(xβ + offset): see [R] nberg.
For a random-effects overdispersion model, we allow δ i to vary randomly across groups; namely, we assume that 1 / (1 + δ i ) ~ Beta(r, s) 
